Uncivil Aviation: How the Ongoing Trade Dispute Stalemate between Boeing and Airbus has Undermined GATT and May Continue to Usher in an Era of International Agreement Obsolescence under the World Trade Organization by Mathis, Marc C.S.
Tulsa Journal of Comparative and International Law
Volume 13 | Issue 1 Article 6
9-1-2005
Uncivil Aviation: How the Ongoing Trade Dispute
Stalemate between Boeing and Airbus has
Undermined GATT and May Continue to Usher in
an Era of International Agreement Obsolescence
under the World Trade Organization
Marc C.S. Mathis
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tjcil
Part of the Law Commons
This Casenote/Comment is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Tulsa Journal
of Comparative and International Law by an authorized administrator of TU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact daniel-
bell@utulsa.edu.
Recommended Citation
Marc C. Mathis, Uncivil Aviation: How the Ongoing Trade Dispute Stalemate between Boeing and Airbus has Undermined GATT and May
Continue to Usher in an Era of International Agreement Obsolescence under the World Trade Organization, 13 Tulsa J. Comp. & Int'l L. 177
(2005).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tjcil/vol13/iss1/6
UNCIVIL AVIATION: HOW THE ONGOING TRADE DISPUTE
STALEMATE BETWEEN BOEING AND AIRBUS HAS
UNDERMINED GATT AND MAY CONTINUE TO USHER IN AN
ERA OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT OBSOLESCENCE
UNDER THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
Marc C.S. Mathist
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the introduction of the 707 in 1954, Boeing has enjoyed its status
as the preeminent jet aircraft manufacturer worldwide.1 Boeing's global
stature was solidified in the late 1960s when it introduced the 747 jumbo
jet, "one of the most significant [jet] aircraft ever created."2 At about the
same time Boeing introduced the 747, the European consortium Airbus
came onto the civil aviation scene by introducing its own twin aisle
passenger jet, the A300.3 While the Airbus aircraft represented a new
entry into the Boeing dominated civil aviation industry, the unfamiliarity
with the manufacture of large civil aircraft, and the oil embargo4 of the
1970s kept Airbus from becoming a formidable threat to Boeing's market
t J.D. candidate 2006, University of Tulsa, College of Law, Tulsa, Oklahoma. I would like
to thank my parents and family for all of the support they have provided me, making
possible all that I have achieved. I would also like to extend my gratitude to my friends and
members of the Tulsa Journal of Comparative and International Law for their feedback
and hard work prepping this comment for publication.
1. JOE CHRISTY & LEROY COOK, AMERICAN AVIATION: AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY
340 (Joanne Slike et al. eds., 2d ed. 1994) [hereinafter AMERICAN AVIATION].
2. GUY NORRIS & MARK WAGNER, BOEING 121 (Mike Haenggi ed., 1998) [hereinafter
BOEING].
3. IAN MCINTYRE, DOGFIGHT: THE TRANSATLANTIC BATTLE OVER AIRBUS 36
(Praeger 1992) [hereinafter DOGFIGHT].
4. STEVEN McGUIRE, AIRBUS INDUSTRIE: CONFLICT AND COOPERATION IN US-EC
TRADE RELATIONS 48 (1997) [hereinafter AIRBUS CONFLICT].
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• 5dominance. Nonetheless, over the last 35 years Airbus has proven to be a
serious competitor, and has even supplanted Boeing as the world's number
6one aircraft manufacturer. Currently, Airbus outpaces Boeing in aircraft
deliveries. However, it is the newest product rolling out of Toulouse 8 that
is at the epicenter of the latest international trade dispute between the
United States and the European Union.9 In January 2005, Airbus unveiled
the Airbus A380,u which will soon become "the largest passenger airliner
ever put into service.
It is not Airbus' success that has caused the rift between the United
States and European Union, but rather the nature in which this success has
come about.1 Since its inception, Airbus has received financial support in
the form of governmental subsidies to fund the research and development
of new aircraft. 3  The financial arrangement 4 between the Airbus
consortium and European governments has allowed Airbus to introduce
five new products, including the A380, in the past ten years, versus just one
from rival Boeing. 5
Several rounds of negotiations and international agreements have
been entered into, created with the hope of resolving the brewing trade
dispute regarding subsidies and civil aircraft. 6  The most contentious
5. STRATEGIC ISSUES IN EUROPEAN AEROSPACE 37 (Philip K. Lawrence & Derek
Braddon eds. 1999) [hereinafter STRATEGIC ISSUES].
6. Philip J. Sweitzer, The Boeing 767 Tanker Boondoggle: How the Corporate-Sales-
Pitch Procurement Regime Lost its Parent and the U.S. Economy International Billions, 23
PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. 383, 400 (2004).
7. Advisory Board, U.S. and EU File WTO Cases Challenging Subsidies to Boeing and
Airbus, 1 No. 5 INT'L GOv'T CONTRACTOR T 40 (2004).
8. Airbus, Manufacturing, available at
http://www.airbus.com/en/worldwide/airbus-in-france.html (last visited Dec. 6, 2005)
[hereinafter Manufacturing].
9. Roland Gribben, Planemakers Win More Time for Aid Accord, DAILY TELEGRAPH
(London), Jan. 18, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 665220.
10. Jorn Madslien, Airbus to Unveil Giant A380, BBC NEws BUSINESS REPORTER, Jan.
17, 2005, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4174729.stm.
11. Editorial, Of Things Great and Small, WALL ST. J. CLASSROOM ED., Mar. 2005,
available at http://www.wsjclassroom.com/archive/05mar/edit-editorial.htm.
12. STRATEGIC ISSUES, supra note 5, at 38.
13. Jennifer A. Manner, How to Avoid Airbus II: A Primer for Domestic Industry, 23
CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 139, 143-44 (1992) [hereinafter Airbus II].
14. The financial agreement between Airbus and European governments is also
commonly referred to as "launch aid." Global Agenda, A Hulking Beast Joins the
Dogfight, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 18, 2005, at
http://www.economist.com/agenda/displayStory.cfmstoryid=3555366.
15. Id.
16. Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft, Apr. 12, 1979, GATT B.I.S.D. 26S/162 (1979).
[Vol. 13:1
UNCIVIL AVIATION
disputes have been centered on the Agreement on Trade in Civil
Aircraft," the 1992 bilateral agreement between the United States and
European Communities (E.C.), is and the formation of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) and its Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures. 19 Failure to strictly adhere to these agreements has, for all
intents and purposes, rendered these agreements obsolete.
By the mid 1980s, the United States began to view Airbus as a threat
to their market share and entered into bilateral "negotiations with the




However, the United States filed a request for consultation with the
WTO's dispute settlement body on October 12, 2004 for violations of the
Agreement Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, and the Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.2' The E.C. filed a similar action
against the United States later that day, claiming violations of the same
agreements.22  These reciprocal filings make it apparent that these
negotiations have failed in achieving its stated objective.
This comment will examine the nature of the allegations made by the
United States and the European Union before the WTO's dispute
settlement body.23 Part II of this comment will begin with a reflection on
the historical background of Boeing and Airbus. It will reveal the
circumstantial and foundational differences in which these two companies
developed, provide insight into the rationale of governmental subsidies
provided to Airbus, and the sustenance provided to Boeing in the form of
17. Id.
18. See AIRBUS CONFLICT, supra note 4, at 136.
19. See infra note 198.
20. Shane Spradlin, The Aircraft Subsidies Dispute in the GATT's Uruguay Round, 60 J.
AIR L. & COM. 1191, 1206 (1995) ((citing Jennifer A. Manner, How to Avoid Airbus II A
Primer for Domestic Industry, 23 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 139, 141 (1992) (citing Gellman
Research Associates, An Economic and Financial Review of Airbus Industrie, Sept. 4,
1990, at 4 - 3 to 4 - 8)).
21. Request for Consultations by the United States, European Communities & Certain
Member States - Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/1 (Oct. 12,
2004) [hereinafter Request by U.S.].
22. Request for Consultations by the European Communities, United States - Measures
Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS317/1 (Oct. 12, 2004) [hereinafter Request
by European Communities].
23. The WTO's DSB is a panel that "consists of representatives of every WTO Member"
to handle "disputes arising under any of the WTO agreements." DAVID PALMETER &
PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION:
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 15 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2004) (1999). The Dispute
Settlement Understanding (DSU) is the system that establishes the "institutional and
jurisdictional scope of WTO dispute settlement[s]." Id. at 16.
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governmental contracts. Part III addresses the underlying issues and
weaknesses of the international agreements that are purportedly aimed at
controlling subsidies and regulating trade of civil aircraft. This section will
focus on the agreements forged at the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) Tokyo round, the 1992 bilateral agreement reached
between the United States and the E.C., and the GATT Uruguay round,
which led to the creation of the WTO, and the Agreement on Subsidies
and Countervailing Measures. It will also discuss how the lack of sufficient
dispute resolution and enforcement mechanisms of the Uruguay round and
bilateral agreement has undermined the objectives of these agreements
and has created an air of skepticism in future civil aircraft agreement
adherence. In Part IV, the formal requests for consultation by the United
States and E.U. will be examined to see how the assertions in each apply to
the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft, and Agreement on Subsidies
and Countervailing Measures. Specifically, it will address the issue of
whether state and local tax incentives provided to Boeing are subject to
these agreements, and if so, what protections exist that may limit the reach
of dispute settlement body rulings at the state level. This section will also
address the framework of the direct governmental subsidies received by
Airbus by certain member states of the E.C. and the limitations set by the
agreements. Finally, Part V of this comment will conclude by reviewing
what possible options may be available to the United States in light of this
current dispute.
II. BACKGROUND
A historical view of Boeing and Airbus reveals how the circumstantial
differences behind the formation of these companies lend insight to their
individual philosophies. Boeing's reliance on government military
contracts and Airbus' dependence on direct governmental subsidies
provide a glimpse into the origin of the current trade dispute before the
WTO.
24
A. Story of Boeing
The success story of how Boeing came to be the world's foremost
aerospace manufacturer does not seem all that uncommon, relative to
other large companies. Bill Boeing came from a wealthy family who was
heavily invested in the timber and mining industries in the Pacific
24. See Request by U.S., supra note 21; Request by European Communities, supra note
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Northwest. 25 Fascinated with aviation, Boeing and two partners started
Pacific Aero Products in 1916.6 Boeing's venture was perfectly timed with
21the onset of World War I in August of 1914. While the aircraft did not
play a significant role in the outcome of the war, the war accelerated
aircraft development, and established that aviation was undoubtedly a part
of the world's future. 2' Boeing ensured that his company would be a part
of that future by opening up an office in Washington D.C. to bid on
29lucrative military plane contracts.
Following the close of the First World War, ninety percent of the U.S.
aviation manufacturers went out of business. ° However, thanks to Bill
Boeing's business acumen, he set out on alternative business ventures; the
income from these ventures, coupled with his great personal wealth,
ensured that the newly reconfigured and renamed Boeing Airplane
Company survived." The U.S. Army began to recognize the need for
32
aircraft in order to become a superior military force. Boeing won the
military contract to manufacture or modernize other manufacturers'
aircrafts33 by outbidding his competitors by approximately one million
34dollars.
Boeing gained invaluable experience by rebuilding and upgrading
hundreds of planes for military use.35 Most notably was a new arc welding
technique that Boeing developed, which allowed it to manufacture
stronger, more durable fuselages36 in less time. 7  Using this to its
advantage, Boeing parlayed this success into a series of government
contracts that yielded several different models of military aircraft that
25. T.M. SELL, WINGS OF POWER: BOEING AND THE POLITICS OF GROWTH IN THE
NORTHWEST 12 (2001) [hereinafter WINGS OF POWER].
26. Id. at 13.
27. AMERICAN AVIATION, supra note 1, at 18.
28. Id. at 22.
29. See WINGS OF POWER, supra note 25, at 14.
30. Id.
31. Id. Although Boeing did survive, it did struggle through turbulent financial times,
reporting fiscal losses as much as $300,000 in 1920. BOEING, supra note 2, at 13.
32. STEVEN FERRY, THE STORY OF BOEING 7 (2000).
33. BOEING, supra note 2, at 13.
34. FERRY, supra note 32, at 7.
35. BOEING, supra note 2, at 13-14.
36. The fuselage is "the central body portion of an aircraft designed to accommodate the
crew and the passengers or cargo." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 474
(10th ed. 1994).
37. BOEING, supra note 2, at 13.
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continued to introduce new technologies and improvements over previous
models.38
Boeing began to move into the realm of bigger aircraft in the early
1930s when the U.S. government expressed a need for large capacity, long
range bombers.3 9 Once again, Boeing proved proficient to the task and
was awarded another military contract. 4° Boeing met and exceeded the
challenges that the U.S. military provided, and in doing so, produced some
of the most famous and well-known military aircraft in the world.41 Boeing
produced two of the most legendary bombers, the B-17 "Flying Fortress,"
and the famous B-29 "Superfortress., 42 Soon thereafter, Boeing began
producing larger jet powered bombers, such as the B-47 and the B-52.43
"By 1943, Boeing contracts for military planes totaled $1
billion .... " ,44 This led many to believe that Boeing's future was destined
to be in large military aircraft.45  But the introduction of Britain's De
Havilland's commercial jet powered Comet 46 led Boeing to think
otherwise.47 Before Boeing moved ahead into the realm of jet commercial
aviation, the military once again called upon Boeing to produce a jet
powered aircraft that was capable of flying fast enough to refuel the jet
powered B-52 bomber.48 The result was the jet powered Dash 80.4' The
Dash 80 grew out of a design project Boeing had been working on that was
centered around the same airframe50 that could serve as a jet transport and
the jet powered tanker that the military required. 51 From the Dash 80
airframe design, Boeing produced the KC-135 tanker for the military and
52the 707 for commercial use. Given that commercial jet aviation was still
38. See id. at 10-26.
39. Id. at 51.
40. Id.
41. See id. at 51-80.
42. See id. at 53-60. The B-29 "Superfortress" will always be stigmatized as the bomber
that carried and subsequently dropped the world's first and second atomic bombs on
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan. BOEING, supra note 2, at 57.
43. See id. at 64-80.
44. WINGS OF POWER, supra note 25, at 19.
45. BOEING, supra note 2, at 83.
46. See infra text accompanying note 68.
47. BOEING, supra note 2, at 83.
48. AMERICAN AVIATION, supra note 1, at 340.
49. BOEING, supra note 2, at 83-84.
50. Id. at 84.
51. Id. at 83-84.
52. AMERICAN AVIATION, supra note 1, at 340. It is noteworthy to mention that the
Boeing 707 was used as the United States presidential aircraft for almost 30 years before it
[Vol. 13:1
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in its relative infancy, the KC-135 provided Boeing with a steady stream of
income for the first ten years of its jetliner manufacturing."53
Development of the 707 alongside the KC-135 and other military
aircraft was advantageous for Boeing.54 Much of the ground and in-flight
testing for the military aircraft could be done and used for application on
the commercial products as well.5 . In addition, Boeing used the 707
airframe to produce derivative aircraft, namely the 720, 727, and the
venerable56 "737, which has since become the best-selling airliner in
aviation history., 57 Over the years, Boeing has produced several other
aircraft that have set milestones within the aviation industry. In 1969,
Boeing launched the 747, which was the largest commercial airliner ever
offered at the time, and it revolutionized airline travel forever.18 Most
recently, Boeing announced the release of the 777-200LR, which is touted
as being the world's longest range commercial airplane capable of flying
long haul "routes that have never before been possible."'59
B. Story of Airbus
The theme of collaboration, governmental support, and protectionism
for the European aviation industry can be traced back to the dawn of
aviation. 6° The story of how Airbus came to be is long and filled with
several hurdles that had to be overcome. 6' Following the end of World
was replaced by another Boeing product, the 747, in 1990. Boeing, Air Force One
Background Information, at
http://www.boeing.com/defense-space/military/afl/aflinfo.html (last visited Dec. 6, 2005).
53. BOEING, supra note 2, at 95.
54. STRATEGIC ISSUES, supra note 5, at 33.
55. AMERICAN AVIATION, supra note 1, at 341.
56. BOEING, supra note 2, at 101.
57. FERRY, supra note 32, at 23.
58. AMERICAN AVIATION, supra note 1, at 403.
59. Boeing, Boeing 777 Program Background, available at
http://www.boeing.com/commercial/777family/background.html (last visited Dec. 6, 2005).
According to the manufacturer, the 777-20OLR will enable "airlines to service nonstop
routes such as New York-Singapore and Los Angeles-Dubai[.]" Marc Birtel, Boeing
Unveils 777-200LR Worldliner - Longest Range Commercial Jetliner, February 15, 2005,
available at http://www.boeing.com/news/releases/2005/ql/nr_050215g.html.
60. MATrHEW LYNN, BIRDS OF PREY 14-18 (Mandarin Paperbacks, 1996) (1995)
[hereinafter BIRDS OF PREY]. Inspired by the accomplishments of the Wright Brothers in
the United States, British engineer Geoffrey De Havilland designed, built and flew his own
airplane in 1910. Id. The British government quickly recognized that aviation would be an
integral part of the future and created an aeronautical research establishment that
purchased De Havilland's plane and hired him to oversee future development. Id.
61. See infra note 128.
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War II, Europe saw a need to enter the commercial aviation industry in
order to challenge the aviation manufacturers in the United States, which
up to that time had dominated the global market.62 The answer to this
challenge came in the form of Airbus Industrie (AI) in 1970.6' Al is a
consortium "[f]ormed under French law.., as a Groupement d'Int6ret
lIconomique (GIE)" between A6rospatiale of France, Deutsche
Aerospace of Germany, British Aerospace of the United Kingdom, and
Construcciones Aeronauticas S.A. of Spain (CASA). 65  But to truly
appreciate the story behind Airbus, it is necessary to understand the state
of the European aviation industry and the economic and political
difficulties Britain, France, and Germany faced after World War II.
1. Britain
In the years following the allied victory in World War II and leading
into the dawn of the Cold War, Britain knew that a strong and sound
aerospace industry would be vital given the military and political
66implications. Since there was a natural decline in military aircraft orders
after the war, the British government began to apportion civil aircraft
67research and development projects to several British industrial firms.
"'From 1945 to 1950, [there were] nine [different] British firms.., in
production on fourteen different types of... aircraft"' and of these, the
most notable civil product was the famous Comet by De Havilland in
1952.6 The Comet was significant for several reasons, but most notably, it
was evidence that the British plan of being a worldwide leader in civil
aviation was a practicality. The Comet was also historical for being the
world's first jet commercial airliner,69 and it was undoubtedly the source of
immense British pride. 0 But after only two years of airline service, the
Comet experienced a series of crashes due to structural failures during
62. DAVID WELDON THORTON, AIRBUS INDUSTRIE: THE POLITICS OF AN
INTERNATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COLLABORATION 1 (1995) [hereinafter AIRBUS POLITICS].
63. Id.
64. "[a] GIE is not a company, and escapes many of the obligations of a company. For
example, it does not have to publish accounts nor does it have to pay taxes, unless it choses
to do so... It simply pools the capital contributed by its members, and its results are taken
on to the books of its member companies in proportion to their share of the enterprise."
LYNN, supra note 60, at 113.
65. AIRBUS POLITICS, supra note 62, at 1.
66. Id. at 34-35.
67. Id. at 35.
68. Id. at 35-36.
69. CHARLES BURNET, THREE CENTURIES TO CONCORDE 53 (1979).
70. Id. at 177.
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flight, resulting in several fatalities,71 and the Comet was ultimately
72grounded. While the Comet resumed flying after intense investigation
and testing, the damage had been done.73 Within a year, Boeing released
its first jet commercial transport, the Boeing 707, which was larger and
more reliable than the British offerings.74 Despite the "buy British"
campaign the government had instituted,75 the British were forced to
purchase Boeing 707s, resulting in a temporary, yet notable, set back in the
British jet transport industry.76
The decline in the British aviation industry continued throughout the
1950s and into the 1960s resulting in the consolidation of many industry
manufacturers. 77 By 1964, Hawker-Siddeley Aviation Limited and British
Aircraft Corporation (who later merged to form British Aerospace)'
emerged as the primary manufacturers of fixed wing aircraft,79 while
Bristol-Siddeley and Rolls-Royce remained as engine producers.80
By 1965, the British government came to the realization that if they
wanted to compete with the American aircraft manufacturers, they would
have to collaborate with other European countries in forming a collective
81European aviation industry. While parliamentary reaction was mixed
over the idea to proceed, Britain elected to move forward on a
collaborative civil aviation project with France and Germany by signing a
82Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in 1967. However, soon after
the signing of the MoU, fears over upsetting the transatlantic relationship
with the United States," coupled with spiraling research and development
71. Id. at 178.
72. Grounding of an aircraft prohibits the grounded model from flying due to an unsafe
condition that is likely to cause injury or damage to persons or property. See Federal
Aviation Administration, Airworthiness Inspector's Handbook 8300.10, available at
http://www.faa.gov/library/manuals/examiners-inspectors/8300/volumel/ledia
1_0010O.pdf.
73. BURNET, supra note 69, at 178.
74. Id.
75. AIRBUS POLITICS, supra note 62, at 35.
76. BURNET, supra note 69, at 181.
77. AIRBUS POLITICS, supra note 62, at 36-37.
78. Id. at 43.
79. BURNET, supra note 69, at 231.
80. AIRBUS POLITICS, supra note 62, at 37.
81. Id. at 38.
82. Id. at 38, 75.
83. Id. at 37-38. Britain had developed a strong bond with the United States originating
from World War II that was important to maintain. Id. In addition, chairman of the
committee of inquiry into the aircraft industry, Lord Plowden, recommended that Britain
purchase its complex military weaponry from the United States. Id.
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costs of the collaboration project, led the British to reconsider their
decision.84
British Prime Minister Harold Wilson expressed the British sentiment
over the collaboration project saying that it resembled "'a desert track
littered with the whitening bones of abortive joint projects mostly
undertaken at high cost.' 8' 5 Finally, in 1969, minister of technology Tony
Benn cemented Britain's fate with regard to the collaborative venture
saying "Her Majesty's Government [was] not yet satisfied with.., the
project... [and n]othing could be more fatal to European collaboration
than for the British Government to be ready to finance anything that was
international and advanced regardless of its prospects., 86 Consistent with
this view, Britain withdrew from the collaborative agreement leaving
France and Germany to "pursue the project on a bilateral basis."87
2. France
France, unlike Britain, was under German occupation during the
1940s, and upon the advent of liberation by the allied forces was eager to
restructure many facets of government and social institutions.88 Beginning
with the enthusiastic leadership of General Charles De Gaulle in 1945,
France began laying the groundwork to establish itself as the dominant
player of European aviation. 90
The French quickly realized the comparative advantage gained by
providing a successful manufacturer with a monopoly.9' As a result, the
French manufacturer assault developed expertise in military aircraft
production and was able to produce the popular Mirage fighter that gained
several orders from countries' outside France.92 This same approach was
applied to the civil aviation industry where the national aviation firm of
Sud-Est was awarded a contract to produce a jet aircraft to supply Air
France, the national airline of France.93 Similar to the Mirage fighter, this
84. DOGFIGHT, supra note 3, at 21-23.
85. Id. at 23 (citing Financial Times, February 14, 1961).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. AIRBUS POLITICS, supra note 62, at 45.
89. President of the Fifth French Republic. 1957-1969: The Early Years of the Fifth
Republic, at http://www.charles-de-gaulle.org/article.php3?id-article=374 (last visited Dec.
6, 2005).
90. AIRBUS POLITICS, supra note 62, at 50.





project also gained popularity with other national airlines outside of
France, most notably, Scandinavian Air Systems.
94
Similarly to the British, the French also saw a decline in the aviation
market in the late 1950s.15 Given the interventionist nature of the French
government in the aviation industry, it sought to merge several of the firms
to maintain specialization.% The result was the creation of A6rospatiale,
which specialized in civil and military airframes, and SNECMA,97 which
specialized in civil and military engines. 9'
By the late 1950s, France recognized that they were being outpaced by
American aviation firms in terms of aircraft design and manufacturing.
To further their economic, political, and social interests, France sought a
collaborative venture with many of its European neighbors.10 Beginning
in 1958, France collaborated with Germany, Belgium, and Holland to
design and build a military patrol aircraft that competed directly with the
U.S. firm Lockheed.'0 1 At the same time, a group of French, German, and
Italian firms and subcontractors co-designed a large troop transport
aircraft that was intended to compete directly with the widely popular
Lockheed C-130 Hercules. 1°2 While both of the collaborative projects
failed to have the intended impact, they nevertheless illustrated the
practicality of collaborative ventures, and provided a benchmark for future
Franco-German collaborative ventures, namely the formation of Airbus
Industrie in 1970.103
3. Germany
When drawing a comparison between the challenges that Britain,
France, and Germany faced in recovering from the effects of World War II
and retooling their respective economic, political, and social policies, none
were greater than the challenges faced by Germanyi"4 During the first half
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. AIRBUS POLITICS, supra note 62, at 51-52.
97. "SNECMA" is the acronym for Socirt6 National d'Etude et Construction des
Moteurs d'Aviation. Id. at xii.
98. Id. at 51-52.
99. Id. at 52-53.
100. Id. at 53-54.
101. Id.
102. AIRBUS POLITICS, supra note 62, at 54-55. The Lockheed C-130 continues to serve as
the primary troop and freight hauler for the U.S. military. AMERICAN AVIATION, supra
note 1, at 390.
103. AIRBUS POLITICS, supra note 62, at 55.
104. Id. at 57.
2005]
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
of the twentieth century, Germany endured the rise and subsequent
control of Adolf Hitler, the Third Reich, the Nazi party, wars with several
European neighbors, damage and destruction of industry by the Allied
forces, and the occupation and division of Germany into separate allied
military zones.' °5 Despite these events, the Germans would use the Cold
War, Korean conflict, and expanding international markets to reestablish
its political and economic development.1°6  During the World Wars,
Germany displayed that its aviation industry, in particular the military
sector, was well established, given the massive amount of research into
wing design and jet engines.'0 7 The readiness to employ this knowledge
and ability to rebuild the aviation industry in Germany was apparent, but
was greatly limited pursuant to the Versailles agreement."'
The German aerospace industry began to take off again in the late
1950s when the German aviation manufacturers were called upon to
produce aircraft for NATO forces.' 9 As the aerospace industry began to
gain momentum in the 1960s, German aerospace manufacturers
underwent a large consolidation movement similar to what was seen in
Britain and France, with the intent of benefiting from a smaller, yet more
specialized and concentrated industry." ° German government support for
this movement was undeniable when they formally announced that they
would openly provide financial aid and contracts "'to induce the
enterprises to combine into larger, and thus competitive units. ' ' ' .
The Germans also supported the idea of collaborative aviation
ventures as was seen in the joint ventures with its European neighbors in
producing military transport and patrol aircraft.12  The Germans had
added impetus for collaboration projects in addition to producing a
105. Id. at 57-58.
106. Id. at 58-61.
107. See generally id. at 62-63. Being the first to ever fly jet fighters late in World War II,
the Germans proved proficient in the development and design of jet engines and wing
design. Jan Pudlow, Chesterfield Smith 1917-2003, 77 FLA. B.J. 8, 15 (Nov. 2003).
108. See generally AIRBUS POLITICS, supra note 62, at 62-63 (The Versailles agreement
was the peace treaty that effectively ended World War I. PEACE TRETIES AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN EUROPEAN HISTORY: FROM THE LATE MIDDLE AGES TO WORLD
WAR ONE 383 (Randall Lesaffer ed., 2004) The agreement was signed by Germany on
June 28, 1919 and established limitations on German geography, industry, and
expenditures. Id. at 383-396.)
109. Id. at 63.
110. Id. at 63-64.
111. Id. at 64 (citing Aerospace America, April 1990).
112. Id. at 54-55.
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competitive product to challenge the American manufacturers."' Through
collaboration, Germany was able to increase its "technical competence and
political respectability," not to mention subjecting their aerospace industry
to increased transparency, which given the not too distant past, was much
to the liking of its surrounding neighbors.!
4
Reflecting on similarities of the conditions as they existed in Britain,
France, and Germany, it is easy to see that the time was ripe for a major
collaborative effort to create a European aircraft that could compete with
American built aircraft, namely Boeing, and possibly enter into the
American market."5 While Britain was keen to undertake the project at
that time, it did so with some reservation when costs began to escalate
before manufacturing even began.' 6 Haunted by the relative commercial
failure of the Comet, " ' and the veritable financial black hole that was
Concorde,' 8 Britain elected to withdraw from the Airbus project in 1969
when costs began to skyrocket and disagreements between Britain, France,
and Germany arose over who would supply the power plants for Airbus
aircraft." 9 While some initially believed that this would doom the future of
Airbus before it even got off the ground, the Franco-German resolve
pressed on with a new reorganized bilateral agreement that formally
formed Airbus Industrie in 1970. Within a year, France and Germany
welcomed Spain as a full member "with a 4.2 per cent stake held through
the state-owned firm Construcciones Aeronauticas.','21
Beginning with the rejoining of Britain into the consortium in the late
1221970s, Airbus began to materialize as a legitimate competitor of
Boeing. 12 Airbus has since capitalized on the launch aid 124 provided by the
113. Id. at 1.
114. AIRBUS POLITICS, supra note 62, at 64.
115. See BIRDS OF PREY, supra note 60, at 18-19, 51.
116. See BURNET, supra note 69, at 177-78.
117. See generally id. at 178.
118. Id.
119. AIRBUS POLITICS, supra note 62, at 78.
120. Id. at 77-78.
121. AIRBUS CONFLICT, supra note 4, at 38.
122. Id. at 65.
123. Id. at 101.
124. Stanley Holmes, Boeing vs. Airbus: Time to Escalate, BUSINESS WEEK, March 21,
2005, at
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/mar2005/nf20050321_4418_db046.htm
("Launch aid.., shifts [Airbus] risk away from the market. Airbus has been able to tap
into $15 billion in government loans since its inception in 1970, including $3.2 billion for the
mega A380. That government money has shielded Airbus from the same market risks that
2005]
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
member state governments by developing an entire family of aircraft thatS . "125
can directly compete with the aircraft offered from U.S. manufacturers.
Airbus is now incorporated as a "simplified joint stock company, '' 126 and is
one division of the larger European Aeronautic Defense and Space
Company (EADS).1
21
In retrospect, it is noteworthy to acknowledge Airbus Industrie's
accomplishments and the conditions in which they accomplished them.
Airbus launched its first aircraft during the height of the oil crisis of the
1970s, which saw a large scale back on aircraft orders and deliveries.
Airbus had to contend with the fact that Boeing was an accepted
household name within the aviation industry, and that airlines that did not
128fly Boeing products "were not as well regarded" as those who did.
Despite these hurdles, with the assistance of governmental subsidies,
Airbus continued to plow forward. Within 30 years of the flight of its first
jet, Airbus dethroned Boeing as the worldwide leader in large civil aircraft
manufacturing, 129 and proved its technological skill in creating the world'slargest passenger jet.130
III. INTERNATIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AFFECTING CIVIL
AIRCRAFT
Although Airbus had only been in existence for four years by the time
the GATT Tokyo round of multilateral trade negotiations began, the U.S.
government, at the behest of the U.S. aviation industry, began to show
concerns over "increasing international competition in [the] aerospace"
industry.131  These concerns were mainly centered on the issue of
face Boeing and any other commercial competitor. One of the many benefits of European
launch aid is that Airbus isn't required to pay back the loans if the aircraft program is
unsuccessful. However, if sales of Boeing's 787s flop, Boeing loses billions and faces the risk
of going out of business. If A380 sales falter, Airbus doesn't have to repay the $3 billion in
loans").
125. See generally AIRBUS CONFLICT, supra note 4, at 48-118.
126. A Single Entity with a Global Industrial Presence, at
http://www.airbus.com/en/corporate/people/company structure/ (last visited Dec. 7, 2005).
127. See generally European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company LADS N.V., at
http://www.eads.net/frame/lang/en/xmnl/content/FOFOOOOO400004/9/50/29665509.html
(last visited Dec. 6, 2005).
128. AIRBUS CONFLICT, supra note 4, at 48-49.
129. Editorial, Airbus Queuing up for a Future, THE JAPAN TIMES, Jan. 29, 2005, available
at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.p15?ed20050129al.htm (Dec. 6, 2005).
130. Daniel Michaels, Big Plane May Give Lift to EADS, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 2005, at
Cl.
131. AIRBUS CONFLICT, supra note 4, at 68-70.
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"'predatory [export] financing, '' 13 2 and the fact that Airbus was
government-owned or government-supported."' Inevitably, the United
States' concerns materialized when Airbus penetrated the U.S. market
with a major sale of aircraft to U.S. air carrier Eastern Airlines1 3 The
elimination of the Civil Aeronautics Board 135 in the United States opened
the door for airlines to compete on price thus making the idea of cheaper
aircraft competition a welcomed option.136 Given Airbus' encroachment
on Boeing's home turf, the need for the United States to address the issue
of Airbus' governmental subsidization was unavoidable. The United
States approached the E.C. on the issues of subsidization and export
finance for civil aircraft for the first time at the Tokyo round of the
GATT.137 The ultimate failure of this agreement led to several follow-up
agreements, including a bilateral negotiation with the E.C. in 1992 (Airbus
Accord),138 and the Uruguay round of the GAT in 1994 (GATT 1994) 39
132. Id. at 48-53. When Airbus entered the aviation market in the 1970s, it was
customary for manufactures of aircraft to involve themselves in the securing of financing
the purchase of their aircraft. Id. at 51. While this was not problematic for wealthy
American manufacturers who had longstanding relationships with finance institutions that
provided them with attractive financing terms as a new entrant, Airbus was at a
disadvantage. Id. To remedy this problem, Airbus enlisted the export finance
bureaucracies of Germany and France to provide them with financing terms at below
market rates. Id. This act was aimed at attracting export business, specifically from the
American market. Id. U.S. aircraft manufacturers considered this activity to be "'predatory
[export] financing."' AIRBUS CONFLICT, supra note 4, at 53 (citing FINANCIAL TIMES, Apr.
26, 1978, at 6.)
133. Id. at 69.
134. Id. at 52.
135. The Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) was one-half of the Civil Aeronautics Authority
that was responsible for all aviation matters in the United States related to "safety
rulemaking, accident investigation, and economic regulation of the airlines." Edmund
Preston, The Federal Aviation Administration and Its Predecessor Agencies, at
http://www.centennialofflight.gov/essay/Government-Role/FAA-History/POL8.htm (last
visited Dec. 6, 2005). "Prior to the passage of the Airline Deregulation Act .... (CAB)
maintained tight control over the U.S. airline industry, awarding new routes and permitting
fare adjustments ...... Gabriel S. Meyer, U.S.-China Aviation Relations: Flight Path
Toward Open Skies?, 35 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 427, 436 (2002). When the airline industry was
deregulated in the late 1970s, it "grant[ed] airlines full freedom to select domestic routes...
and dropp[ed] all domestic fare regulations." Id. This in turn "intensified competition in
the form of increased imports from foreign competitors." Sandra E. Black & Elizabeth
Brainerd, Importing Equality? The Impact of Globalization on Gender Discrimination, 57
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 540, 541-542 (2004).
136. AIRBUS CONFLICT, supra note 4, at 42-44.
137. Daniel I. Fisher, "Super Jumbo" Problem: Boeing, Airbus, and the Battle for the
Geopolitical Future, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 865,872 (2002).
138. AIRBUS CONFLICT, supra note 4, at 136.
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that gave rise to the WTO and the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures.
14 0
A. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Tokyo Round
The Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft was a product of the
GATT Tokyo round (Tokyo round) of multilateral trade negotiations.
141
Since the original GATT was proficient in the reduction of tariffs, the
Tokyo round zeroed in "on the reduction of subsidies and other nontariff
barriers., 142 The Tokyo round's preamble expressly establishes that one of
the goals is to "eliminate adverse effects on trade in civil aircraft resulting
from governmental support in civil aircraft development, production, and
marketing.' 4'  However, central to the trade dispute between the United
States and E.C. is Article VI, which covers "Government Support, Export
Credits, and Aircraft Marketing."'" The relevant sections read:
6.1 Signatories note that the provisions of the Agreement on
Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and
XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures)
apply to trade in civil aircraft. They affirm that in their
participation in, or support of, civil aircraft programmes
they shall seek to avoid adverse effects on trade in civil
aircraft in the sense of Articles 8.3 and 8.4 of the Agreement
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. They also shall
take into account the special factors which apply in the
aircraft sector, in particular the widespread governmental
support in this area, their international economic interests,
and the desire of producers of all Signatories to participate
in the expansion of the world civil aircraft market.
6.2 Signatories agree that pricing of civil aircraft should be
based on a reasonable expectation of recoupment of all
costs, including non-recurring programme costs, identifiable
139. Shane Spradlin, The Aircraft Subsidies Dispute in the GATT's Uruguay Round, 60 J.
AIR L. & COM. 1191, 1200-1202 (1995).
140. Richard 0. Cunningham, Subsidies to Large Civil Aircraft Production: New WTO
Subsidy Rules and Dispute Settlement Mechanism Alter Dynamics of U.S. -E. U. Dispute, 14
AIR & SPACE LAW. 4, 6 (1999).
141. AIRBUS CONFLICT, supra note 4, at 68.
142. Spradlin, supra note 139, at 1195.
143. Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft, Apr. 12, 1979, GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at
preamble (1980) [hereinafter ATCA].
144. Id. art. VI.
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and pro-rated costs of military research and development on
aircraft, components, and systems that are subsequently
applied to the production of such civil aircraft, average
production costs, and financial costs.
145
As a method of "[s]eeking to eliminate adverse effects on trade in civil
aircraft, 146 members agreed to forbid export subsidies, but continued to
141 148allow domestic subsidies under the Tokyo round subsidies code. The
remaining flaw in the subsidies code was the failure to provide a definition
of the term "subsidy,, 149 which proved to be the foundation for future
disputes between the United States and E.C., including the current dispute
before the WTO's dispute settlement board. "0
Had the United States vigorously pursued any trade dispute under the
GATT system as it existed following the Tokyo round, it would have
exposed the weaknesses in the dispute mechanism of the GATT.' First, if
the United States had prevailed from a GATIT dispute panel ruling, the
E.C. would be free to block the ruling and continue the subsidies given to
Airbus.'52 Second, the GATT dispute panel is "governed by the practice of
consensus decision making,' 53 requiring the parties of the action to agree
to each step in the process. 54 This practice tends to lead to vague decisions
145. Id.
146. Id. at Preamble.
147. Although domestic subsidies were allowed under the Tokyo round subsidies code,
they were actionable by assessing countervailing duties. Spradlin, supra note 139, at 1196.
148. Fisher, supra note 137, at 872-73. The agreement to allow domestic subsidies was
permitted due to the prevailing opinion that they are "'widely used as important
instruments for the promotion of social and economic policy objectives."' Id. at 873 (citing
Agreement in Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXII of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Nov. 6, 1979, GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) art. 9 (1979)).
Additionally, many governments were under pressure to provide subsidies to domestic
industries that were suffering from the worldwide recession. Spradlin, supra note 139, at
1195.
149. Spradlin, supra note 139, at 1196.
150. In 1991, the U.S. filed a complaint over alleged $26 billion in domestic subsidies
granted to Airbus from all member states of the E.C. from 1968-1989. Airbus II, supra note
13, at 150. The U.S. failed to aggressively pursue the action due to the uncertain definition
of the term "subsidy" and the fact that domestic subsidies are neither "per se prohibited ...
[nor] expressly actionable." Id.
151. Id. at 150-51.
152. Id. at 150.
153. Robert E. Hudec, Reforming GATT Adjudication Procedures: The Lessons of the
Disc Case, 72 MINN. L. REv. 1443, 1462 (1988).
154. Id.
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that are open to individual interpretation.' Finally, and probably most
noteworthy, is the lack of a method of enforcement.' Even in the event
that a signatory to the GATT is found to be providing a prohibited
subsidy, the recourse calls for "recommendations to the parties as may be
appropriate to resolve the issue and, in the event the recommendations are
not followed, it may authorize such countermeasures as may be
appropriate" to resolve the issue.' Outside of the recommendations and
possible countermeasures authorized by the GATT committee, there is no
legal requirement to comply with the decision or recommendations
contained therein.18 This inevitably has led to the belief that the GATT
cannot serve as a legitimate forum to resolve international trade
disputes'9
GATT law and dispute procedures were heavily criticized for being
outdated and ineffective. 60 It is questionable how any signatory could rely
on a system where the recipient of a complaint could simply reject an
• . 161
unfavorable decision by the GATT committee. This, in addition to the
conspicuous absence of an established time table for committee action,
heavily influenced whether a party would even bring an action.
Additionally, the original GATT method of dispute resolution reflected its
diplomatic roots,163 favoring mediating disputes as opposed to settling
them,164 "which did not promote compliance with GATT rules.' 65
B. The 1992 Bilateral Agreements Between the United States and the
E. C.: The Airbus Accord
155. Airbus II, supra note 13, at 151.
156. Id.
157. Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the
Agreement of October 30, 1947, as Rectified by the Procesverbal of December 17, 1979 art.
13(4), Apr. 12, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 9619, 31 U.S.T. 513.
158. Airbus II, supra note 13, at 151.
159. See Fisher, supra note 137.
160. ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY
291 (1990).
161. Fisher, supra note 137, at 885.
162. Id. The main disincentive to pursue an action under the GATT resolution system
without a time table was that it caused significant delay. Id. This could result in a waste of
financial resources because the matter often became moot by the time a resolution was
offered. Id.
163. PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 23, at 6.
164. Id. at 6-7.
165. Dana T. Blackmore, Eradicating the Longstanding Existence of a No-Precedent Rule
in International Trade Law - Looking Toward Stare Decisis in WTO Dispute Settlement, 29
N.C. J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 487,489 (2004).
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The limited success of the Tokyo round gave the United States need
to enter into additional negotiations with the E.C. in order to resolve the
issue over subsidies. 66 At the outset, the negotiations sought to establish a
mutual understanding of permissible levels of government subsidization
for large civil aircraft.' 67 However, the negotiations soon became aimed at
eliminating direct subsidies provided to Airbus1 68 and limiting the amount
of indirect subsidies paid to Boeing in the form of defense spending and
NASA programs. 69 The necessity to pursue such an agreement "outside of
the GATT framework [was done in order] to hedge against the" potential
failure of the GATT 7
Although the negotiations began in 1984,11 no substantive agreement
was created until April of 1992, with the creation of the Airbus Accord. 72
The Airbus Accord embodies three main provisions for the United States
173 171
and E.C." applicable to aircraft with greater than one hundred seats.
First, direct government subsidies for aircraft development cannot exceed
one-third of the total cost of development,"' and this direct financial
176
support is subject to specific conditions of repayment. With respect to
Airbus, these government subsidies will only be available when Airbus has
-• 177
reached a point of relative market share parity with Boeing. Second, the
level of indirect subsidies cannot exceed three percent of the total turnover
• . 178
of the civil aviation industry, and sales of civilian aircraft were limited tofour percent of the annual turnover of a civil aviation manufacturer in that
166. Spradlin, supra note 139, at 1208.
167. Cunningham, supra note 140, at 5.
168. Spradlin, supra note 139, at 1207.
169. AIRBUS CONFLICT, supra note 4, at 147.
170. Spradlin, supra note 139, at 1207. This acknowledgment further exposes the
"failures of the GATT dispute settlement system... [and] its procedural weaknesses."
Benjamin L. Brimeyer, Bananas, Beef, and Compliance in the World Trade Organization:
The Inability of the WTO Dispute Settlement Process to Achieve Compliance from
Superpower Nations, 10 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 133, 137 (2001) [hereinafter Bananas,
Beef].
171. Spradlin, supra note 139, at 1206.
172. AIRBUS CONFLICT, supra note 4, at 155.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 150.
175. Estimated levels of contribution by the member state governments prior to the
Airbus Accord are believed to be "approximately sixty to seventy percent of production
costs." Airbus II, supra note 13, at 154.
176. Id.
177. See HOLMES, supra note 124.
178. AIRBUS CONFLICT, supra note 4, at 155.
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country."' Finally, a certain level of transparency is required to allow a
bilateral panel to monitor compliance with the agreement.'8°
While this agreement appeared to advance relations between the
United States and E.C. on the matters of subsidization, many problems
with the Airbus Accord and its interpretation undermined its
effectiveness. 8' One of the largest weaknesses of the Airbus Accord is
that it provides "escape clauses" for the United States and the E.C. in the
event certain criteria were met. A second weakness of the agreement
was in the transparency requirements."" While it is expected that the
transparency requirements would be met with cooperation by Airbus, the
French business organization that it was formed underI 4 does not compel
financial disclosure. Nevertheless, the Airbus Accord allowed for the
United States and E.C. to opt out of the transparency requirement if they
considered the disclosure of such information to be "contrary to its
essential security interests. 1 6 Section nine of the Airbus Accord provided
a broader scope of nonconformity with the agreement if either party could
identify "exceptional circumstances," which exempted them from the
terms. 8' Although mostly seen as a weakness from a United States
perspective, the Airbus Accord failed to achieve its original objective of
eliminating direct subsidies to large civil aircraft manufacturersI
Irrespective of the cap that the Airbus Accord did establish on direct
subsidies,9 it still permits "an enormous amount of subsidization "19 and
only applies to subsidization on future projects, leaving the subsidization of
former projects untouched.191 Finally, the Agreement falls short of having
a true enforcement mechanism allowing either party to unilaterally
192terminate the Airbus Accord upon submission of a written request.Despite the original impetus behind a bilateral agreement with the E.C. on
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Spradlin, supra note 139, at 1208-10; see also AIRBUS CONFLICT, supra note 4, at 156;
see also Airbus II, supra note 13, at 154-56.
182. AIRBUS POLITICS, supra note 62, at 147.
183. Airbus H, supra note 13, at 155.
184. See generally AMERICAN AVIATION, supra note 1.
185. Airbus II, supra note 13, at 155.
186. AIRBUS POLITICS, supra note 62, at 147.
187. Id.
188. Cunningham, supra note 140, at 6.
189. See AIRBUS CONFLICT, supra note 4.
190. Spradlin, supra note 139, at 1210.
191. Airbus H, supra note 13, at 154.
192. Cunningham, supra note 140, at 6.
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aircraft subsidies, it has since been rendered obsolete with the United
States, "exercise[ing] its right, as provided by the 1992 Agreement's terms,
to terminate [the] agreement." '193
C. The WTO and the Agreement of Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures
Given the relative failures of the Tokyo round and the Airbus Accord
between the United States and the E.C., the formal establishment of a
coherent forum for dispute resolution and available remedies for subsidy
disputes was a priority entering the Uruguay round of the GATT in 1994
194(Uruguay round). During the Uruguay round, the GATT signatories
identified that the GATT had a weak institutional basis, and that a new
trading system with a "clear, logical and strong institutional structure"
needed to be created.9 The result was the WTO.
1 9 6
The formation of the WTO brought about two essential
improvements over the Tokyo round and the 1992 bilateral agreement.
197
The first notable improvement was that the WTO created the Agreement
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement) that
198provides the definition of a subsidy, which is at the heart of the United
States and E.C. request for considerations 9  The second improvement
that the WTO created was a modernization of the inadequate dispute
resolution arrangement that existed under the GATT.200 The adoption ofthe Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU)20' and its procedures has
193. Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, U.S. Files WTO
Case Against EU Over Unfair Airbus Subsidies (Oct. 06, 2004) available at
http://www.ustr.gov/Document-Library/Press-Releases/2004/October/US-Files-WTO-Cas
e_AgainstLEU-OverUnfairAirbusSubsidies.html.
194. J. Michael Showalter, A Cruel Trilemma: The Flawed Political Economy of Remedies
to WTO Subsidies Disputes, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 587, 593 (2004).
195. JOHN CROOME, GUIDE TO THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS 6 (Kluwer Law Int'l
1999).
196. Id.
197. PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 23, at 13-15.
198. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization - Results of the Uruguay Round,
art. 1.1, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/24-scm.pdf [hereinafter
SCM]. The Uruguay round abandoned the distintion between export subsidies and import
subsidies and focused on "defin[ing] subsidies in terms of financial contribution by a
government [that] confer[s] a benefit on the recipient." ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD,
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 72 (John H. Jackson ed., 2003) (2002).
199. See supra notes 21-22.
200. CROOME, supra note 195, at 17.
201. See PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 23.
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made the resolution of international trade disputes more "legalistic," and
consequently binding. 02 It is the characteristics of the WTO's dispute
settlement mechanism that makes it "one of the most sophisticated
international legal systems in" the world. 20 3
1. The SCM Agreement and the Definition of a Subsidy
As mentioned above, the WTO's SCM Agreement provides a
definition of a subsidy,20 4 which was notably absent in the prior GATT
subsidies code and bilateral agreements. The SCM Agreement is not
specifically tailored to the civil aircraft industry alone, but stands as "the
WTO's 'generic agreement regarding subsidies.'" 206 The SCM Agreement
considers financial support a subsidy if:
(a)(1) there is a financial contribution by a government or
any public body within the territory of a Member (referred
to in this Agreement as "government"), i.e. where:
(i) a government practice involves a direct transfer of funds
(e.g. grants, loans, and equity infusion), potential direct
transfers of funds or liabilities (e.g. loan guarantees);
(ii) government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or
not collected (e.g. fiscal incentives such as tax credits)[ ];
(iii) a government provides goods or services other than
general infrastructure, or purchases goods;
202. Id. at 85.
203. Blackmore, supra note 165, at 488.
204. The SCM Agreement classifies subsidies into three categories; prohibited,
actionable, and non-actionable. Prohibited subsidies are contingent on export performance
and "upon the use of domestic over imported goods." SCM, supra note 198, at Art. II.
Exceptions to the rule on prohibited subsidies apply to countries who are developing and to
those who are in a transition to a market economy. CROOME, supra note 195, at 94.
Actionable subsidies are those that cause adverse effects upon another Member. SCM,
supra note 198, at art. V. Specifically, adverse effects include "injury to the domestic
industry... [or] serious prejudice to the interests of another Member." Id. at art. V. Non-
actionable subsidies are those that are not specific within the meaning of prohibited
subsidies. Id. at art. III. These subsidies mainly include but are not limited to research that
is conducted by universities or other research facilities so long as the subsidies are "not
more than 75 per cent of the costs of industrial research." Id. at art. XIII.
205. See Cunningham, supra note 140, at 6.
206. William Petit, The Free Trade Area of the Americas: Is it Setting the Stage for
Significant Change in U.S. Agricultural Subsidy Use?, 37 TEX. TECH L. REV. 127, 147 (2004)




(iv) a government makes payments to a funding mechanism,
or entrusts or directs a private body to carry out one or
more of the type of functions illustrated in (i) to (iii) above
which would normally be vested in the government and the
practice, in no real sense, differs from practices normally
followed by governments; ... and
(b) a benefit is thereby conferred. 2°7
By assigning a definition to the term "subsidy," the SCM Agreement has
finally paved the way "to effect an international discipline in [the]
extremely sensitive area of international economic relations, and helped
legitimize the SCM Agreement by providing an unambiguous definition.
2. Establishment of an Improved Forum of Dispute Resolution
The method of how disputes are handled in the WTO is reminiscent
of the more conciliatory methodologies utilized in the original GATT .2 °9
The DSU2'° encourages and prefers disputing members to resolve the
dispute on their own.21 For this reason, dispute settlement begins with a
formal request for consultation 212 in which the complaining member
provides the reasoning behind the request, and establishes the legal basis
211for the request . If the disputing parties are unable to resolve the dispute
214
on their own within a 60-day period, the dispute moves to the next stage.
Upon request by the complaining member, a panel convenes to make a
formal decision of what the Agreement at issue requires. 215  This
empanelment, through the member's request, serves to fulfill the due
process requirement by placing the responding member on notice of the
216claims at issue. Again, if the disputing members are still unable to
217
resolve the dispute, the matter goes before the panel, who in turn issues
207. SCM, supra note 198, at art. 1.
208. Ivan Krmpotic, Brazil-Aircraft: Qualitative and Temporal Aspects of "Withdrawal"
Under SCM Article 4.7, 33 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 653, 654 (2002).
209. PETER GALLAGHER, GUIDE TO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 6 (2002).
210. See, PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 23, at 15.
211. GALLAGHER, supra note 209.
212. Id.
213. PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 23, at 87.
214. Id. at 95-96.
215. GALLAGHER, supra note 209, at 6.
216. PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 23, at 94.
217. The panel process calls for multiple written submissions from the disputing members
where the members lay out their interpretation of the facts, and their arguments in light of
those facts. Id. at 156. Following the written submissions, the parties meet with the panel
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a report to the dispute settlement body (DSB), complete with its findings
and recommendations within a specified time frame.218 In the event that
the WTO's DSB finds that a government is providing a prohibited subsidy,
the offending government has a window of opportunity to cease the
prohibited subsidy, or face authorized countervailing measures from the• • .219
complainant. Two other important improvements over the traditional
GATT dispute mechanism are that the WTO creates the right to appeal to
an Appellate Body, and implements a system of "reverse consensus,
220
when implementing DSB decisions, making it more difficult for a member
221to block a panel decision.
The creation of the WTO during the Uruguay round has signaled a
step forward in terms of establishing a more reliable forum for settling
trade disputes, specifically those that involve the use of subsidies. By
providing a concrete definition of a "subsidy" in the SCM Agreement,
coupled with the creation of the DSB and procedures under the DSU, the
WTO has resolved many of the problems and shortcomings under previous
bi-lateral and GATT Agreements.
IV. PROBLEMS WITH THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION'S DISPUTE
MECHANISM, SUBSIDIES, AND INTRUSION UPON STATE SOVEREIGNTY
Even though the formation of the WTO and the DSB signify a vast
improvement over the GATT and the bilateral agreement between the
United States and E.C. in terms of enforcement, it is not without faults.
First, while the WTO does represent a "clear, logical and strong
where each party presents their case, and the panel can ask questions. Id. The panel then
submits a panel report to each party to ensure accuracy of the members' argument
summary. Id.
218. See id. at 167-70. The DSU also allows for the possibility of appeal by an appellate
body that is comprised of members who are not affiliated with any government.
Blackmore, supra note 165, at 492.
219. CROOME, supra note 195, at 94. A party that is the recipient of an unfavorable
decision from the DSB may still file an appeal to the WTO's Appellate Body, that in turn
must be "unconditionally accepted by the parties." LOWENFELD, supra note 198, at 154.
220. The term "reverse consensus" or "negative consensus" refers to a system where a
DSB decision is upheld "unless there is consensus to the contrary," whereas the "positive
consensus" method used under the GATT system required a consensus to adopt a decision.
PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 23, at 15.
221. Edward T. Hayes, Changing Notions of Sovereignty and Federalism in the
International Economic System: A Reassessment of WTO Regulation of Federal States and




institutional structure, 222 where disputing countries can settle trade
conflicts, it has shown that in some circumstances, specifically those
between superpower nations, that it has had limited success in enforcing its
decisions.223 Secondly, the E.C. complaint specifically targets state and
local governments within the United States for providing prohibited and
actionable subsidies. 22' The E.C. request for consultation complains that:
The measures that are the subject of this request are
prohibited and actionable subsidies provided to US
producers of large civil aircraft (LCA) and in particular the
BOEING company, as well as legislation, regulations,
statutory instruments and amendments thereto providing
such subsidies, grants, and any other assistance to the US
producers (US LCA industry). The measures include the
following:
1.State and Local Subsidies
a.State of Washington
i.Tax benefit/incentive package for production of Boeing
7E7
- Washington House Bill No. 2294 (2003);
b.State of Kansas
i.Financial incentive package, including preferential bond
financing, for Boeing 7E7
- Kansas Senate Bill No. 281 (2003);
c.State of Illinois/City of Chicago
222. Andrea Greisberger. Enhancing the Legitimacy of the World Trade Organization:
Why the United States and the European Union Should Support the Advisory Centre on
WTO Law, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 827, 830 (2004).
223. See infra notes 228-48.
224. See Request by European Communities, supra note 22. Ironically, Airbus benefits
from the same subsidies that it complains about in its request before the WTO "For
example, in 2003, EADS, Europe's largest defense contractor, received $8.6 million in tax
breaks for locating a Eurocopter assembly factory in Mississippi. That included $6 million
from local governments for new buildings to lease to Eurocopter and $2.6 million in state
incentives." Holmes, supra note 124. Additionally, in early 2005, Airbus pitched a $600
million manufacturing plant in the United States that "drew representatives from 35 [U.S.
states]." Staff & Wire Reports, State Vies for Airbus Plant, TULSA WORLD, February 16,
2005. The primary impetus behind this venture is to develop and produce a refueling
tanker to compete with Boeing for a multi-billion dollar contract from the United States
Air Force. Id. Many Washington lawmakers have identified this effort as a "ploy to
capture American tax dollars for a French company and French jobs." Id.
2005]
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i.Tax incentives, relocation assistance, development grant,
25
rental-free headquarters for Boeing corporate relocation.
The E.C. focus on the state and local level raises the question of whether
state and local action is subject to the SCM Agreement, and if so, whether
there are constitutional constraints that could further limit the
enforcement of a WTO mandate.
A. Enforcement and Compliance Problems with WTO Decisions
Since there has not been an official action from the WTO over the
matter of subsidies and civil aircraft, one can look to see how other WTO
disputes have been handled to uncover some of the difficulties that are
likely to plague the current aircraft dispute. There are two well known and
high profile disputes between the United States and European Union that
should lend insight to the possible problems that lie ahead for the dispute
226
of subsidies and civil aircraft; the Banana War, and the dispute over the
use of beef hormones.
1. The Banana War
The Banana War between the United States and European Union
originated in 1993 when the European Union elected to create a common
market for banana imports referred to as the "European Union Banana
Regime" (Regime). 28 The purpose behind this regime was to provide
former British Commonwealth banana producing countries229 with "non-
reciprocal duty-free and quota-free access to [EU] markets." 230  The
2311United States issued a complaint under the GATT in 1993, and
subsequently challenged the Regime claiming that it ran contrary to WTO
Agreements.212 The WTO DSB issued an unfavorable decision to the
European Union in 1997, to which the European Union appealed.23' The
225. See Request by European Communities, supra note 22 (emphasis removed).
226. Bananas, Beef, supra note 170, at 147.
227. Id. at 155.
228. Id. at 148.
229. Referred to as "ACP Countries" denoting the former British colonies in Africa, the
Caribbean, and the Pacific Nations. Erin N. Palmer, The World Trade Organization Slips
Up: A Critique of the World Trade Organization's Dispute Settlement Understanding
Through the European Union Banana Dispute, 69 TENN. L. REv. 443, 445 (2002).
230. Id.
231. "[I]n conjunction with several Central American banana producers...." Bananas,
Beef, supra note 170, at 148.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 149.
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WTO Appellate body upheld the decision, which under the DSU, compels
E.U. compliance or face retaliatory countermeasures from the United
234States. The European Union commenced a series of delaying tactics,1" 235
and failed to bring the Regime within WTO compliance. This inaction
led the United States to impose one hundred percent duties on $191.4
million worth of European imports in 1 9 9 9 .136 It was not until 2001, that
the United States and the European Union finally came to a bilateral
agreement over the Regime. 23 Under this agreement, the United States
agreed to lift its sanctions against E.U. imports in return for the European
Union making "a transition to a tariff-only system by 2006."
218
2. The Dispute over Beef Hormones
In the late 1980s, the E.U. instituted a ban on all beef that used
certain natural or synthetic hormones.239 The E.U. ban was implemented
under the auspices of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement), which provides that:
Members have the right to take sanitary and phytosanitary
measures necessary for the protection of human... life or
health .... Members shall [also] ensure that any sanitary or
phytosanitary measure is applied only to the extent
necessary to protect human... life or health, is based on
scientific principles and is not maintained without sufficient
scientific evidence... [And that these] sanitary and
phytosanitary measures shall not be applied in a manner
which would constitute a disguised restriction on
international trade.24
234. Id. at 148.
235. Id. at 150-51.
236. Id. at 152.
237. Press release, European Communities, Commission Adopts Regulation to End
Banana Dispute (April 11, 2001) available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/miti/dispute/bana-agr.htm (on file with author).
238. Id.
239. Bananas, Beef, supra note 170, at 155.
240. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15,
1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, Art. 2, Legal Instruments - Results of the Uruguay
Round, vol. 27 (1994), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/15-sps.pdf.
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In 1996, the United States complained to the WTO that the European
ban on "Frankenfoods ,41 was not supported under the SPS Agreement
due to the lack of scientific evidence showing that there were harmful
242effects to human life or health. The WTO held that the ban constituted
an unfair trade barrier, to which the European Union, predictably,
243
appealed. In 1998, the WTO's Appellate Body affirmed the decision of
the DSB, but overturned some of the DSB's reasoning.2 " The European
Union interpreted the Appellate Body's decision as an authorization to
maintain the ban for a period of fifteen months to allow for scientific
findings on the adverse effects on human health and life.245 In 1999, fifteen
months after the Appellate Body's decision, the European Union
246announced that it had no intention to lift the ban on U.S. beef imports.
In response, the United States applied for, and was granted, authority to
247assess tariffs on $128 million of E.C. exports. The E.C. maintains its ban
on hormone-treated beef imports from the United States, and has even
issued an E.C. directive that upholds the ban that was deemed illegal by
the WTO
2 48
Analyzing the Banana War and Beef Hormone cases, expose some of
the weaknesses that undermine the WTO's dispute process and challenges
• • .- 249
its legitimacy. For example, in the Banana War case, the WTO issued a
241. "Frankenfoods" is a term that is commonly used in Europe to define foods that have
been genetically modified. See Hunter R. Clark, International Law Association Panel
Discussion on "Divergence Between the United States and the European Union on Trade and
Other Matters," 10 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 459, 463 (2004).
242. Bananas, Beef, supra note 170, at 156.
243. Alberto Alemanno, Judicial Enforcement of the WTO Hormones Ruling Within the
European Community: Toward EC Liability for the Non-Implementation of WTO Dispute
Settlement Decisions?, 45 HARV. INT'L L.J. 547, 553 (2004). The E.U. appealed the decision
on the ban based on the on the notion "that governments have the fundamental right to
choose the level of health protection they consider necessary for their citizens." Bananas,
Beef, supra note 170, at 157.
244. Bananas, Beef, supra note 170. The decision of the Appellate Body was largely
based "on the ground that the legislation was not based on a complete assessment of the
cancer risks associated with the use of certain growth hormones in cattle." Alemanno, supra
note 243, at 553.
245. Bananas, Beef, supra note 170, at 157.
246. Id.
247. Alemanno, supra note 243, at 553.
248. Id. at 554. While the E.C. has issued a directive upholding the illegal ban, the E.C.
maintains that this legislation is in line with the WTO's ruling because "it is based on new
scientific evidence." Id.
249. Bananas, Beef, supra note 170, at 163.
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decision that ruled the E.C. Regime contrary to WTO Agreements. 250
Instead of abolishing the Regime, the E.C. adopted a liberal, if not wholly
inaccurate, interpretation of the decision, holding that it required them to
only amend rather than abolish the Regime.251 When, or if, the existing
Regime is officially abandoned in 2006, it will have been operating for
252
almost a full decade after the WTO ruled it to be an illegal regime.
There are also similarities in the beef hormone dispute where the WTO
ruled against the European Union, and the European Union refused to
abide by the WTO ruling, choosing instead to interpret the ruling in a
manner that led to further delay and blatant non-conformity to WTOAgreements.253
It is evident that the WTO needs to adopt a better method of issuing
254decisions that are less ambiguous and closed to member interpretation.
As it stands now, and was shown apparent in the aforementioned disputes,
the current method promotes a scheme that leads to non-compliance, and
255
thus further undermines the WTO dispute resolution authority. In
addition, these cases also suggest that economically stable and powerful
members such as the United States and E.C. may prefer sanctions over
strict adherence to a WTO decision. 26
The banana and beef hormone disputes may provide an unappealing
glimpse of what may be awaiting the outcome of the current subsidies and
civil aircraft dispute before the WTO. As will be discussed below, a
negative ruling against the United States or E.C. will likely set off a similar
trend of using delay tactics and interpretive meandering that will once
again snub observance of the WTO's ruling.
B. State and Local Government Action Subject to the SCM Agreement
The current U.S. claim before the WTO's DSB alleges that the E.C.
provides prohibited export subsidies 25 to Airbus in the form of direct
financing from European member States for research and development
costs for large civil aircraft, loans at below-market rates, and the
250. See Alemanno, supra note 243.
251. Bananas, Beef, supra note 170, at 161-62.
252. See supra note 233.
253. See supra text accompanying note 246.
254. Bananas, Beef, supra note 170, at 162.
255. Id. at 162-63.
256. Id. at 161.
257. See SCM, supra note 198.
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forgiveness of previously incurred debt.258 However, the E.C. claim alleges
that the United States is in violation of the SCM Agreement due to Boeing
receiving tax and financial benefits,29 as well as other incentive packages
from several state and local governments.2 °  One of the fundamental
differences between these two claims is the United States' focus on the
national government action of European member states, whereas the E.C.
focus is on the independent action of state and local governments within
the United States.261 The purpose of the language in section 1.1(a)(1) of
the SCM Agreement that covers "financial contribution[s] ... [of] any
public body within the territory of a Member" was added to extend the
262
reach of the Agreement to sub-national governments. For reasons
offered in part III above, if the United States ever faced an unfavorable
ruling from the GATT dispute panel, it would run little risk of trouncing
• 263
on individual state sovereignty. However, that is not the case under the
WTO, where an unfavorable decision of the DSB would "establish[] an
international law obligation upon the member in question to change its





In the event that the current subsidies and civil aircraft consultation is
submitted to the DSB, and the United States is handed an unfavorable
decision, it will raise the question of what action individual sovereign states
will be expected to take to be in compliance with the WTO decision. This
question inevitably raises the separate question as to what extent the
federal government must act to compel states to come into conformity.
258. See Request by U.S., supra note 21. In the request for consultations, the U.S. asserts
that the E.C. and the Airbus consortium member state governments "provide subsidies that
are inconsistent with their obligations under the SCM Agreement and the GATT 1994." Id.
259. In 2003, Boeing announced that it would be moving forward in the development of a
new mid-sized super efficient aircraft. See generally Deborah Maranville, Unemployment
Insurance Meets Globalization and the Modern Workforce, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1129,
1139 (2004). As a result, several states entered into a competitive bidding process to entice
Boeing to build the new aircraft in their respective states to benefit the local business and
employment markets. Id. at 1139-40. Washington state was one state that Boeing chose
when Washington offered a "$3.2 billion package including 'a 40 percent reduction in
the ... business and occupations (B&O) tax, as well as providing property tax breaks and
research and development tax credits [that] will last for 20 years."' Id. at 1140 (citing
Carolyn Nielsen, Pleasing Boeing Worth the Price, BELLINGHAM HERALD, June 19, 2003,
available at 2003 WL 11648173).
260. See Request by European Communities, supra note 22.
261. Id.
262. CROOME, supra note 195, at 96.
263. See supra text accompanying notes 141-49.
264. LOWENFELD, supra note 198, at 156.
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However, before either one of these questions is answered, some attention
should be given to the question of whether the state and local action is
considered to be a subsidy, or just an established and constitutionally
protected method of stimulating the local economic base and encouraging
domestic industry.
1. States' Authority to Tax and Encourage Domestic Industry or
Prohibited Subsidy?
The United States Supreme Court has held that "[t]he power of a
,,265
state to tax, [is] basic to its sovereignty, and that there is no "dispute[]
that a State may enact laws pursuant to its police powers that have the
purpose and effect of encouraging domestic industry. ' '266 It is common
practice for state and local governments to structure their tax systems to
influence businesses to locate in their community267 in order "to encourage
the growth and development of intrastate commerce and industry. ' '268 The
logical assumption is that providing tax incentives and attracting businesses
265. Bode v. Barrett, 344 U.S. 583, 585 (1953).
266. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 271 (1984). See also Allied Signal Inc. v.
Director, Division of Taxation, 504 U.S. 768, 778 (1992) (noting "that the State's power to
tax an individual's or corporation's activities is justified by the 'protection, opportunities
and benefits' the State confers on those activities (citing Wis. v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S.
435, 444 (1940)).
267. Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States From Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints
on State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L. REV. 377, 382 (1996). In 1991, the state
of Colorado used "the Colorado Business Incentive Fund (CBIF) to fund ... local
governments for the purposes of providing incentives for entities to establish new business
facilities in the state employing a substantial number of new employees." Matthew
Schaefer, State Investment Attraction Subsidy Wars Resulting From a Prisoners Dilemma:
The Inadequacy of State Constitutional Solutions and the Appropriateness of a Federal
Legislative Response, 28 N.M. L. REv. 303, 313 (1998). The "program was established for
the purposes of luring United Airlines to build a new facility in Denver" which would
provide the local communities with several "new job opportunities in the United
Airlines... maintenance facility in Denver." Id. at 314. In 1986, the State of Kentucky
passed legislation that authorized a financial incentive package "to lure Toyota Motor
Corporation to establish a plant in Scott County." Id. at 316. "Kentucky pledged to acquire
a 1600 acre project site in Scott County for Toyota and then develop the site for $35
million... [expecting] to increase income tax collections by $75 million and expected
substantial increases in corporate taxes as well." Id. at 316.
268. Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'r, 429 U.S. 318, 336 (1977). A state or
municipality's ability to lure business and "compete with other States for a share of
interstate commerce.., lies at the heart of a free trade policy." Id. at 336-37.
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will boost local employment, which in turn raises the local tax base, which
269leads to a healthier economy.
One of the central issues in the E.C. complaint is the financial and tax
incentive package that the State of Illinois and City of Chicago offered
Boeing to relocate their headquarters in 2001.270 The total incentive
package was reported to be $63 million, which is about $50 million greater
271than the nearest competitive offer. While the bottom line figure seems
to be an astronomical amount, it is expected that the total impact of the
relocation of Boeing to Chicago, Illinois could return as much as $4.5
272billion in economic growth. Operating under the same rationale to
273 274
stimulate economic growth, the states of Kansas and Washington
269. Michael H. LaFave, Taking Back the Giveaways: Minnesota's Corporate Welfare
Legislation and the Search for Accountability, 80 MINN. L. REV. 1579, 1584 (1996).
270. Richard J. Wall & Robert P. Malyska, Governments Title to Pencils, Paper Clips, and
Other Overhead Items (or Award Ribbons, Half-Eaten Sandwiches, and Funeral Flowers),
32 PUB. CONT. L.J. 563, 575 (2003).
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. The Kansas "economic revitalization and reinvestment act" provides that any
"eligible business" that produces an "eligible project" that has:
(A) Paid at least $600,000,000 in average annual gross Kansas compensation.., and
(B) paid at least $50,000 of average annual gross compensation per Kansas employee
during the base eligibility period; and
(C) has invested at least $1,000,000,000 in real and tangible personal property located
within and currently used in the operation of a business in Kansas; and
(D) is described by north American industrial classification system subsector.
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 74-50,136 (2003).
Aircraft manufacturing may receive benefits under this Act in the form of "Kansas
development finance authority issu[ing obligations] ... to finance the eligible project for
the benefit of the eligible business in an aggregate principal amount not to exceed
$500,000,000." Id. The Kansas State Constitution provides further authority to cities by
"empower[ing them] to determine their local affairs and government including the levying
of taxes, excises, fees, charges and other exactions." KAN. CONST. art. XII, § 5(b)
(amended 1975).
274. Washington House Bill 2294 is "An Act relating to retaining and attracting the
aerospace industry to Washington state" after a finding "that the people of the state have
benefited from the presence of the aerospace industry." H.B. 2294, 58th Leg., 1st Spec.
Sess. (Wa. 2003). "The legislature declares that it is in the public interest to encourage the
continued presence of this industry through the provision of tax incentives...
(13)(a) Beginning October 1, 2005, upon every person engaging within this state in the
business of manufacturing commercial airplanes, or components of such airplanes, as to
such persons the amount of tax with respect to such business shall, in the case of
manufacturers, be equal to the value of the product manufactured, or in the case of
processors for hire, be equal to the gross income of the business, multiplied by the rate of:
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statutorily structured their tax systems in a manner that provides Boeing
with substantial financial incentives to produce the Boeing 787, which is a
complaint of the E.C.
275
As previously mentioned, the language in section 1.1(a)(1) of the
SCM Agreement is specifically aimed at including subsidies that are
provided by sub-national governments, in addition to the national
government. Notwithstanding, should a distinction be drawn between
state and local financial incentives acting as a vehicle to stimulate the local
economic base and being deemed an actionable or prohibited subsidy
under the SCM Agreement? Providing a prohibition on states using
financial and tax incentives "interfere[s] with a [state] government's
abilit[y] to promote development inside of its [own] borders. ' '27 7  As
mentioned above, and as encompassed in the statutory language of the
bills passed by Kansas and Washington, the financial incentives that are
available to Boeing27 s are made on the premise that it is in the best interest
of the public to promote strong economic health, and for the purpose of
economic revitalization, 27 not to impede fair trade. In fact, a close reading
of Washington's bill reveals that the financial incentives are only available
0.4235 percent from October 1, 2005, through the later of June 30, 2007, or the day
preceding the date final assembly of a superefficient airplane begins in Washington state, as
determined under section 17 of this act; and
0.2904 percent beginning on the later of July 1, 2007, or the date final assembly of a
superefficient airplane begins in Washington state, as determined under section 17 of this
act.
(b) Beginning October 1, 2005, upon every person engaging within this state in the business
of making sales, at retail or wholesale, of commercial airplanes, or components of such
airplanes, manufactured by that person, as to such persons the amount of tax with respect
to such business shall be equal to the gross proceeds of sales of the airplanes or components
multiplied by the rate of:
0.4235 percent from October 1, 2005, through the later of June 30, 2007, or the day
preceding the date final assembly of a superefficient airplane begins in Washington state, as
determined under section 17 of this act; and
(ii) 0.2904 percent beginning on the later of July 1, 2007, or the date final assembly of a
superefficient airplane begins in Washington state, as determined under section 17 of this
act." Id.
275. See Request by European Communities, supra note 22.
276. SCM, supra note 198, at art. 1.1(a)(1).
277. Showalter, supra note 194, at 597.
278. A reading of the language in the Bills passed by the states of Kansas and Washington
show that financial incentives are not solely available to just Boeing, but to any business
that produces an "eligible project" KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-50,136 (2003) or is "in the
business of manufacturing commercial airplanes, or components of such airplanes." H.B.
2294, 58th Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (Wa. 2003).
279. See supra notes 270-75.
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to Boeing for a fixed period, and that the partial tax breaks are not even
applicable until Boeing invests a substantial amount of its own capital in
development and production. 0
There is little doubt that Boeing benefits from the financial incentives
that are available to it, yet the question remains whether the motive of the
incentives are subject to the SCM Agreement, or whether it is just a state
acting in a common practice of stimulating181 its own economic base. There
is also little doubt that a strict reading of the SCM Agreement would lead
to the conclusion that a state's financial incentive package may beS• 282
considered to be a prohibited or actionable subsidy. However, in the
event that the WTO does rule on the subsidies and civil aircraft dispute,
this question could provide a basis for the type of interpretive slant that
accompanied the WTO decisions in the Banana War and beef hormone
cases and could complicate this issue even further.
2. Constitutional and Other Limitations of a WTO Ruling
There has been much discussion over the issue of balancing member
sovereignty with the authority of the WTO to compel a member to comply
with its rulings.283 However, a majority of this debate centers around the
issue of national sovereignty, while the issue of state and local sovereignty
284has largely been ignored. It is fully understood that as a member of the
WTO, "'US sovereignty is fully protected under the WTO Agreement'
• 285
and international law. The same cannot be said about state sovereignty.
The WTO exists to "deal[] with the rules of trade between nations," not
between nations and individual states within that nation.286 Nonetheless,
when Congress implemented the Uruguay round agreements that
established the WTO, it gave the agreements similar effect as federal
law.' 87 However, treaties and other international agreements are subject to
280. See Wash. Rev. Code § 82.04.260 (2003).
281. See supra note 266.
282. See SCM, supra note 198.
283. Hayes, supra note 221, at 2.
284. Id. at 3.
285. CHALLENGES TO THE NEW WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 79 (Pitou van Dijck &
Gerrit Faber eds., 1996) (citing the Statement of Administration Action, which
accompanied the U.S. Uruguay Round Act).
286. World Tade Organization, What is the WTO?, at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatise/whatise.htm (last visited Dec. 6, 2005).
287. Hayes, supra note 221, at 18. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
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the prohibitions of the Bill of Rights and other restraints on federal
power.2M The United States operates under "'a system of dual sovereignty
between the States and the Federal Government' which affords states
'substantial sovereign authority." ' 289 Under this consideration, individual
states may be able to seek shelter from the WTO's reach under the Tenth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution which provides that "[t]he powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it
to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people. ' '290
Since the Supreme Court has held that a states power to tax is basic to its
291
sovereignty, individual states may be able to protect their tax incentive
packages offered to the industry under the basic tenants of federalism.
However, if this protection is limited or invalidated by the Supremacy
292
clause, the states may still be exempt from wholly eliminating their tax
incentive packages in order to comply with a WTO ruling.
One of the key issues on this topic is the level of the WTO's authority
in responding to non-conforming measures that are enacted by state and
local governments. 29' The WTO agreements reaffirmation of the "federal
clause, 294 in the original GATF 1947, provide guidance to the
responsibility of each member to act in deference to enforcement of WTO
decisions upon state and local governments. 29' Article XXVI: 12 of the
Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, requires that "[e]ach Member is
fully responsible under GATT 1994 for the observance of all provisions of
GATF 1994, and shall take such reasonable measures as may be available
to it to ensure such observance by regional and local governments and
authorities within its territory. ,296 However, Article XXVI:12 is ambiguous
as to what action by a national government constitutes a reasonable
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
288. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 302 (1987).
289. Hayes, supra note 221, at 13 (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991)).
290. U.S. CONST. Amend. X.
291. Bode, 344 U.S. at 583.
292. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
293. Hayes, supra note 221, at 4.
294. Id. at 5 (citing General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, art.
XXIV:12)
295. Id.
296. Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994, Article XXVI:12, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/10-24.pdf last visited Dec. 23,2005).
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297
measure. To understand what constitutes a reasonable measure, we
must turn to decisions of prior GATT panels for guidance.
In the case of Canada - Measures Affecting the Sale of Gold Coins
298(Canada Gold Coin), the GATT dispute panel reviewed a dispute
between South Africa and Canada "concerning the application of [a] retail
sales tax by the provincial government of Ontario to the sale of gold coins
in a manner which afforded protection to domestic production of gold
coins., 299 The dispute panel subsequently found that the sales tax violated
the Agreements,3°° and then turned its attention on applicability of Article
XXVI:12. 3°1  The dispute panel concluded that "Article XXIV:12
applies.., only to those measures taken at the regional or local level
which the federal government cannot control because they fall outside its
jurisdiction under the constitutional distribution of competence." 0 ' In
coming to its conclusion, the panel added:
that in determining which measures to secure the
observance of the provisions of the General Agreement are
"reasonable" within the meaning of Article XXIV:12, the
consequences of their non-observance by the local
government for trade relations with other contracting
parties are to be weighed against the domestic difficulties of
securing observance. 303
While the GATT dispute panel did approach the topic of what types
of disputes a Member can invoke Article XXVI:12 in the Canada Gold
Coin case, it left unanswered what action is considered to be a reasonable
measure.3 0 The dispute panel did, however, offer slightly more insight into
what is deemed a reasonable measure in the case of Canada-Import,
Distribution and Sale of Certain Alcoholic Drinks by Provincial Marketing
Agencies (Canada Import) 05 This case involved a U.S. complaint that
297. Hayes, supra note 221, at 25.
298. GATT Dispute Panel Report on Canada - Measures Affecting the Sale of Gold
Coins, 1985 WL 291500 (Sep. 17, 1985) [hereinafter Gold Coins].
299. Id. 1.
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alleged the illegal imposition of higher tariffs existed on beer imported
from the United States by provincial liquor boards to maintain their
monopoly on "the supply and distribution of alcoholic beverages within
their provincial borders."3°6 In its decision, the dispute panel held that in
order to determine if Canada took reasonable measures it would have to
show "that it had made a serious, persistent and convincing effort to secure
compliance by the provincial liquor boards with the provisions of the
General Agreement."307
In a later, but related dispute between the United States and Canada
about excise taxes levied on beer and wine imported into particular states,
the United States made the argument that due to the system of dual
sovereignty between the individual states and the federal government, its
authority to bring state and local laws into compliance with the GATT was
limited.3°9 The Dispute Panel considered several U.S. Supreme Court
opinions in context of the Twenty-first Amendment acknowledging that:
[e]ach state has independent legislative and regulatory
authority, and, in response to the Twenty-first Amendment,
each of the states has enacted laws governing the basis on
which alcoholic beverages can be sold. In addition to
regulating the sale and distribution of alcoholic beverages
within their border for social welfare purposes, states [can]
impose excise taxes on alcoholic beverages.
310
The E.C. complains that Boeing is a recipient of several forms of state
and local subsidies that are in contravention of the SCM Agreement.311 As
was suggested in this section, it is not entirely known yet, if state and local
financial and tax incentives are indeed a prohibited or actionable
subsidy."' In the event that they are deemed to violate the SCM
Agreement, the incentives offered by state and local governments may still
be out of the reach of the WTO. In light of U.S. Supreme Court findings
that "[t]he power of a state to tax, [is] basic to its sovereignty," '313 and "that
306. Id. 2.1-2.3.
307. Id. 5.37.
308. See Wash. Rev. Code § 82.04.260.
309. Hayes, supra note 221, at 29.
310. GATT Dispute Panel Report on United States - Measures Affecting Alcoholic and
Malt Beverages, Mar. 16, 1992, GATT B.I.S.D. DS23/R 39S/206, 2.2.
311. See Request by European Communities, supra note 22.
312. See supra notes 265-69.
313. Bode. 344 U.S. at 583.
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a State may enact laws pursuant to its police powers that have the purpose
and effect of encouraging domestic industry," '314 the state and local action
may be a protected right that is unable to be abrogated by the WTO's
DSB.
V. CONCLUSION
Finding a remedy to subsidy disputes, such as this one between the
United States and European Union, is problematic and may promote the
return of protectionism."' Since its implementation, the WTO's SCM
Agreement has undergone scrutiny for trouncing on national, and in the
case of this comment, state and local sovereignty, and has not necessarily
resulted in fairer trade."' The continuing friction over this and other trade
issues has led some to question the long term efficacy of the WTO and
317other multilateral trading systems. Since the creation of the GATT, 1992
Airbus Accord, and WTO, the United States has moved toward a policy
that favors "regionalism, 318 oriented trade pacts, such as the Free Trade
Area of the Americas (FTAA) and the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), as opposed to multilateral and global trade
organizations. 3 9 This shift in policy, coupled with the difficulties seen in
this current dispute over subsidies and large civil aircraft, poses a long-
term threat to the WTO's relevance and viability.32°
Since the commencement of this comment, the stakes of the trade
dispute before the WTO have escalated and could potentially stall or
derail the talks, or in the alternative, escalate them to the WTO's DSB.
Recall that the current dispute at the WTO was brought by the United
States over the subsidized research and development of Airbus' super-
jumbo A380121 that will directly compete with Boeing's jumbo 747322
Following the decision by the United States and European Union to
engage in bilateral talks, Airbus announced that it would apply for
government aid for the research and development of the A350, a new
314. See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. at 263.
315. Showalter, supra note 194, at 626.
316. Id.
317. Clark, supra note 241, at 463.
318. "[E]mphasizes bilateral or regional trade pacts with smaller states, like [NAFTA
and] the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), over comprehensive trade
reform or liberalization in the global context." Id.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Madslien, supra note 10.
322. See BOEING, supra note 2.
[Vol. 13:1
UNCIVIL AVIATION
aircraft that is set to compete directly with Boeing's new super efficient
787.12  Following this decision on March 3, 2005, Airbus announced an
agreement of intent to move forward with the aircraft.324 As recently as
March 18, 2005, U.S. trade representatives announced that the talks with
the European Union and Airbus have stalled, noting that the European
Union and Airbus refuse "to give up [the] government[al] 'launch aid'
because the assistance has been instrumental in the plane maker's rapid
ascent to becoming the world's No. 1 supplier of commercial jets., 325 The
European Union's staunch refusal to give up its launch aid could be tied in
with Airbus' interest in developing, marketing and meeting the rapidly1 26
growing demand in civil aviation in developing nations, and to third
321
country markets.
Subject to a report by a U.S. trade representative, "Congress has left
the door open for both a temporary non-observance of WTO rules and
eventual complete US withdrawal. 32 " The United States could continue
bi-lateral talks with the European Union, or attempt to end the subsidies
given to Airbus by advancing this dispute to the WTO's DSB, or ultimately
take a more drastic measure and completely withdraw from the WTO
altogether, as it did in the 1992 Airbus Accord. The question of whether
the U.S. should walk away from the WTO and continue its trend of
favoring regional trade pacts like the FTAA and NAFFA may or may not
be imminent. However, the outcome of the current subsidies and trade in
large civil aircraft dispute could help in this decision.
323. Advisory Board, U.S. And EU Agree To Aircraft Subsidy Talks, 2 No. 1 INT'L Gov'T
CONTRACrOR J 3, January 2005.
324. Gamesa Signs an Agreement of Intern to Participate in the A350, AIRBUS 4 U, (Mar.
3, 2005) at http://www.airbus.com/airbus4u/articles detail.asp?ae id=1671 (on file with
author).
325. See supra note 124.
326. See Sandeep Gopalan, New Trends in the Making of International Commercial Law,
23 J.L. & COM. 117 (2004).
327. Airbus II, supra note 13, at 155.
328. Andreas L. Paulus, From Neglect to Defiance? The United States and International
Adjudication, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 783, 793 (2004).
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